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1. Introduction
Individuals that found and operate their own ven-
tures make up over 13% of the U.S. workforce
(Hamilton 2000) and have long been acknowledged as
vital for the dynamic renewal of capitalist economies
(Schumpeter 1934, Shane and Venkatraman 2000).
Entrepreneurs often require social resources to found
these ventures (Aldrich and Zimmer 1986). Yet,
Putnam (1995, 2000) has argued that a decrease in
civic involvement by Americans has reduced the
nation’s stock of localized social capital. Among the
negative outcomes of this trend, Putnam (2000, p. 384)
argued, is the possible end of “an arc of creativity and
entrepreneurship.” An implication of Putnam’s argu-
ment is that groups that do continue to engage in local
interactions and maintain their social capital should
be particularly successful in entrepreneurial ventures.
Immigrant entrepreneurs by necessity rely heavily on
local social capital in their new home market (e.g.,
Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). For this reason they
are likely to play an important ongoing role in the
renewal of modern capitalist economies and are wor-
thy of ongoing attention from scholars in business
strategy and entrepreneurship.
While immigrant entrepreneurs have been studied
extensively (e.g., Light 1972, Bonacich and Modell
1980, Aldrich et al. 1984), performance of their ven-
tures has remained under-studied. Similar to argu-
ments made by Lincoln et al. (1996) for the case of
the Japanese keiretsu business groups, we argue that
the least prosperous immigrant entrepreneurs should
beneﬁt the most from the social capital of their ethnic
group. In addition, we argue that assistance of immi-
grant group members is contingent upon geographic
location; entrepreneurs with few resources are more
likely to ﬂourish proximately to the establishments
of high-resource members of the same ethnic group.
Based on this same logic, we explore the possibil-
ity that immigrant entrepreneurs seek out sites with
high-resource countrymen in the vicinity to found
their ventures.
Even if no immigrant entrepreneurs existed within
an industry, a geographic location with an agglom-
eration of related businesses may enhance ﬁrm per-
formance (Marshall 1920), and in particular, the per-
formance of ﬁrms with few resources of their own
(Shaver and Flyer 2000). Given that an industry does
contain immigrant entrepreneurs, when low-resource
immigrant entrepreneurs enjoy superior performance
in the vicinity of high-resource members, is it the eth-
nic/regional group membership or simple agglom-
eration beneﬁts that enhance performance? To dis-
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tinguish beneﬁts of social capital from those of sim-
ple agglomeration, we compare the effects of proxi-
mate high-resource ethnic group members and high-
resource nonmembers (mostly from the native pop-
ulation of the same industry) on survival of immi-
grant establishments that lack their own resources.
We also compare the effect of proximate high-resource
immigrant group establishments on the survival of
low-resource group member establishments with their
effect on the survival of low-resource establishments
owned by nonmembers. Only if both the contribu-
tors and recipients of beneﬁts turn out to be members
of the immigrant group would we conclude that we
have identiﬁed a beneﬁt of social capital rather than
an agglomeration beneﬁt available to all.
Our empirical setting is the lodging industry, an
industry in which previous work has found bene-
ﬁts of agglomeration (e.g., Baum and Haveman 1997,
Canina et al. 2005, Chung and Kalnins 2001). Inter-
estingly, this industry also contains a large group
of immigrant entrepreneurs: hotel owners from the
Indian state of Gujarat. Gujaratis own a large per-
centage of hotels across the United States. In Texas
in 1999, Gujaratis owned over 30% of hotels unafﬁl-
iated with national branded chains. Further, as fran-
chisees, they owned over 50% of properties afﬁliated
with Days Inn, Econolodge, Comfort Inn, and Super
Eight and a substantial proportion of the other major
branded U.S. hotel chains.
In studying Gujarati immigrant entrepreneurs, this
paper follows an earlier work (Kalnins and Chung
2001). That paper treated all Gujarati owners as a
homogeneous group and found that Gujarati hotel
owners cluster at a broad regional (multicounty) level,
but not at a more local (zip code) level. The paper
found no implications for pricing or revenue of a high
Gujarati presence in a zip code. We build on that work
by (1) analyzing establishment-level survival (impor-
tant for capturing cost-side beneﬁts of social capital),
and (2) analyzing the importance of resource hetero-
geneity within an immigrant entrepreneur commu-
nity. This more detailed analysis yields important evi-
dence of social capital not visible when treating all
Gujarati owners as a homogeneous group.
2. Immigrant Entrepreneurs and
Social Capital
2.1. Literature Review
The social structure of an immigrant entrepreneur
group provides motivation for a member’s contribu-
tion to the social capital of the group even in the
absence of direct incentives. Members may have a
motivation to contribute to the group either due to a
principled sense of shared values and shared destiny,
or due to enforceable trust caused by an instrumen-
tal fear of reputation loss (Portes and Sensenbrenner
1993). Importantly, contributions occur among group
members without reciprocity—a member may help
another out ﬁnancially without expecting repayment
in kind.
To develop our hypotheses, we focus on the co-
operative behavior that takes place among immigrant
entrepreneurs, especially behavior not expecting reci-
procity. In such cases, the beneﬁts from group
membership can be attributed to social capital (see
Bourdieu 1986 and Coleman 1990 for the seminal
work on this topic). Synthesizing many deﬁnitions of
social capital, Adler and Kwon (2002, p. 23) state:
Social capital is the goodwill available to individuals
and groups. Its source lies in the structure and content
of the actor’s social relations. Its effects ﬂow from the
information, inﬂuence, and solidarity it makes avail-
able to the actor.
The creation of greater stocks of social capital is
facilitated by certain social structures. The two types of
social structure that underlie immigrant entrepreneur
groups are family relations and common ethnic (or
regional) backgrounds. Common ethnic background
also motivates immigrant entrepreneurs to help oth-
ers within their group (e.g., Light 1972, Bonacich and
Modell 1980). Immigrant entrepreneurs often cluster
in a particular industry in their host nation, enabling
them to further cooperate and generate social capi-
tal. Scholars have identiﬁed cases of Chinese laun-
dries in California (Ong 1981), Gujarati “cornershops”
in Great Britain (Aldrich et al. 1984), as well as the
Gujarati hotel owners in the United States ﬁrst studied
by Kalnins and Chung (2001) and analyzed further in
this paper.
Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993) discuss shared val-
ues and enforceable trust as important sources of
social capital in the context of immigrant entrepre-
neurs. Fledgling immigrant entrepreneurs are likely
to rely on the social capital of their group for support,
because they may not have access to local (and typ-
ically indigenously operated) supporting institutions
such as banks. As a substitute for the local supporting
institutions available to native entrepreneurs, insti-
tutions such as the rotating credit association have
been often raised as key outcomes of shared val-
ues and enforceable trust of immigrant entrepreneur
groups (e.g., Geerz 1962, Light 1972). In the rotat-
ing credit association, members are willing to loan
money without any legally enforceable contract or
collateral. While a member of the credit association
could easily renege on future payments to others after
receiving a loan, the trust is enforceable because the
group members are afraid of the reputation loss they
would face if they reneged. Portes and Sensenbrenner
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(1993) present other examples resulting from enforce-
able trust; for example, loans made to Cuban and
Dominican entrepreneurs by members of their eth-
nic community are paid back with a large certainty
despite their “paperless” nature. The entrepreneur’s
reputation is the only collateral necessary.
Our discussions with Gujarati hotel owners consis-
tently brought out similar anecdotes of help within
the immigrant entrepreneur group. We interviewed
16 Gujarati hotel owners in Texas by telephone for
20–30 minutes each. The interviews were structured
but did not contain any leading questions. For exam-
ple, we simply asked, “In what ways would the man-
agement of your hotel differ if you had no close
contacts with other hotels?” All but one emphasized
the role of other group members in helping them get
started as well as in their continued operations. While
in most cases, there were extended family or friend-
ship ties to those that helped the most, in three cases
there were none, a point that was emphasized with
no prompting from us. These three owners stated
that other Gujaratis who did not know them person-
ally (there were not even mutual friendships) helped
them signiﬁcantly, loaning them money and provid-
ing information and supplies. One Gujarati owner of
an unbranded motel told us:
[A Gujarati owner of a branded chain hotel] helped
me a lot. In franchise, you have to replace furniture,
et cetera, regularly. So, instead of selling it, he gave me
all the stuff he was supposed to sell    People don’t
give away such things for free. He gave me all this just
because I was from the place near to his native. We
don’t have a relation. We met for the ﬁrst time    [He]
helped me without any expectations. I am an ordinary
person. What would he get from me?
2.2. Hypotheses
The access to social capital by immigrant entrepre-
neurs brings us to our “baseline” hypothesis regard-
ing establishment survival. The beneﬁts of social
capital mentioned above, such as access to capital
and information, lower the immigrant entrepreneurs’
costs and thus should help their establishments sur-
vive. The rotating credit association, for example, low-
ers the immigrant entrepreneurs’ cost of capital, while
the donation of supplies (such as the donation of fur-
niture in the quote above) reduces their upfront ﬁxed
costs. Native entrepreneurs may have compensating
access to the local infrastructure (e.g., banks), but
this access typically requires some resources, imply-
ing that the immigrant entrepreneurs should have a
baseline survival advantage over their native low-
resource counterparts.
Hypothesis 1. Among the establishments of owners
without resources, those operated by owners belonging
to an immigrant entrepreneur group will have a lower
probability of failure than establishments operated by
nonmembers.
Further, we expect variation in the contributions to
and the beneﬁts from social capital made and enjoyed
by group members, leading to heterogeneous survival
advantages within a group. Adler and Kwon (2002)
propose that motivation, opportunity, and ability to
contribute to social exchange (i.e., providing a favor
with no explicit quid pro quo) are necessary condi-
tions for social capital to be generated. We expect
that immigrant entrepreneurs have motivation to con-
tribute to the social capital of their group because of
shared values and enforceable trust, although some
group members may have more opportunities and
greater ability to contribute to social capital, that is,
to help others within their group.
Opportunity to help other group members should
be enhanced by geographical proximity. Proximity
has been shown to facilitate transfer of informa-
tion between subsidiaries of the same ﬁrm (Adams
and Jaffe 1996) and enable face-to-face contact
(McDermott and Taylor 1982, pp. 73–74). Through the
frequent and personal contact facilitated by proximity,
group members are able to receive tacit information
regarding which other members actually need help
and what type of help the other members may need.
With such knowledge, proximate group members will
have greater opportunity to help each other versus
more distant members who might also have similar
motivation and ability to help, but not knowledge of
the opportunity to help.
Immigrant entrepreneurs’ abilities to contribute to
social capital are enhanced by the resources they pos-
sess. Members lacking resources are less likely to be
able to help others in their group even when they
have the motivation and the opportunity to do so
(e.g., Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). While group
members possessing resources are less likely to help
their low-resource counterparts for instrumental rea-
sons as those lacking resources are unlikely to be to
be able to reciprocate in the future, the members with
resources are likely to help for reasons of principle.
As established members likely feel a sense of shared
values and destiny with those who have not been as
successful, they are likely to help even in the absence
of the vaguest possibility of reciprocation.
Overall, a combination of resource abundance and
geographical proximity to those who lack resources
will enhance the amount of social capital that a
group member can contribute. Conversely, a lack of
resources combined with proximity to those possess-
ing resources allows a ﬁrm to enjoy the beneﬁts of
social capital. If the effects of social capital sufﬁciently
reduce costs (and in some cases, increase revenues as
well) to have an impact on likelihood of establishment
survival, we should observe three related results.
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First, low-resource establishments of immigrant
entrepreneur group members will be less likely to fail
than will those of nongroup members when in the
vicinity of high-resource group members. While the
low-resource establishments of nonmembers provide
an important comparison for survival rates, the com-
mon ethnic or regional background is required for
ﬁrms to have the ability to receive social capital ben-
eﬁts. Thus, this is not a generic spillover effect that
would apply industrywide to all proximate ﬁrms with
few resources (e.g., Shaver and Flyer 2000, Chung and
Kalnins 2001).
Second, this survival-enhancing effect of proximate
high-resource group members will be greater than
a beneﬁcial effect that may arise from the presence
of high-resource nongroup members. While all prox-
imate high-resource ﬁrms have the opportunity to
help immigrant entrepreneurs that lack resources,
only those sharing their ethnic background have the
motivation to do so because of shared values and a
possible gain in reputation within their community.
Third, immigrant entrepreneurs possessing roughly
equal resource stocks may be able to help each
other survive, but less so than the rich can help the
poor. For example, when neither proximate immi-
grant entrepreneur has resources, they are less likely
to help each other survive because they often lack the
ability. When both entrepreneurs possess substantial
resources, their common ethnicity is unlikely crucial
for survival of their business establishments as their
own resources are of primary importance. These three
related effects are formalized as Hypotheses 2a–2c,
and are also summarized in Table 1.
Hypothesis 2a (Group Membership Matters). The
failure rate of low-resource immigrant entrepreneur group
member establishments will be reduced more than will
the failure rate of low-resource nonmember establishments
by the proximate presence of high-resource group member
establishments.
Hypothesis 2b (Group Membership of Proximate
Others Matters). The failure rate of low-resource immi-
grant entrepreneur group member establishments will be
Table 1 Effect on Low-Resource Hotels’ Failure Rates of Proximity to
Other Hotels
Effect on Effect on
low-resource low-resource
member nonmember
Proximity to
High-resource member A B
High-resource nonmember C D
Low-resource member E F
Predictions A< B (Hypothesis 2a)
A< C (Hypothesis 2b)
A< E (Hypothesis 2c)
reduced more by the proximate presence of high-resource
member establishments than by the proximate presence of
high-resource nonmember establishments.
Hypothesis 2c (Resources of Proximate Group
Members Matter). The failure rate of low-resource immi-
grant entrepreneur group member establishments will be
reduced more by the proximate presence of high-resource
member establishments than by the proximate presence of
other low-resource member establishments.
If the presence of high-resource group members is
beneﬁcial to the group members without their own
resources, as argued above, then we may observe
low-resource group members acting to increase their
ability to enjoy beneﬁts of the group’s social capi-
tal. Sociologists have maintained that actors attempt
to gain social capital through purposeful actions
(Bourdieu 1986, Coleman 1990). While immigrant
entrepreneurs obtain initial membership in the group
merely through their ethnic origins, they can choose
their level of embeddedness within the group by
locating geographically in areas with many group
members or in other areas with just a few. By locating
in an area with many group members, an immigrant
entrepreneur provides incumbent members with the
opportunity to help the ﬂedgling venture.
An alternative logic that predicts the same pat-
tern in location choices is that of mimetic market
entry. Haveman (1993) argues that market entrants
follow high-status ﬁrms into new markets. High-
resource immigrant entrepreneur group members are
likely considered to be of high status, implying that
entrepreneurs would be more likely to locate in their
vicinity to appear more similar to the high-resource
group members. While a distinction between the pur-
poseful and mimetic arguments is outside the scope of
this paper, these logics suggest very similar hypothe-
ses. These hypotheses are analogous to those for sur-
vival presented as Hypotheses 2a–2c: group members
without resources will be signiﬁcantly more likely to
locate in the vicinity of high-resource group members
than will low-resource nongroup members.
Hypothesis 3a (Group Membership Matters).
The probability of low-resource immigrant entrepreneur
group members choosing a location with proximate high-
resource member establishments will be greater than that
of low-resource nonmember establishments choosing such a
location.
Hypothesis 3b (Group Membership of Proximate
Others Matters). The probability of low-resource immi-
grant entrepreneur group members choosing a location
with proximate high-resource member establishments will
be greater than their probability of choosing a location with
proximate high-resource nonmember establishments.
Hypothesis 3c (Resources of Proximate Group
Members Matter). The probability of low-resource
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immigrant entrepreneur group members choosing a loca-
tion with proximate high-resource member establishments
will be greater than their probability of choosing a location
with other proximate low-resource member establishments.
3. Research Design
3.1. Research Setting: Gujarati-Owned Hotels
To test the hypotheses above, we investigate an eco-
nomically signiﬁcant case of immigrant entrepreneur-
ship: Gujarati hotel owners in the United States.
Gujarat is a western coastal state in India whose
main industry is agriculture. Yet, in the United States,
Gujaratis have mainly become hotel owners. While
Gujaratis run hotels in all 50 states, they are particu-
larly prevalent along the interstates of the “sun belt”
that stretches from Virginia to California (Millman
1997, p. 145). Concentrations of Gujarati hotels exist in
Georgia, Florida, California, and Texas. One Gujarati
hotel owner that we interviewed estimated that “in
Dallas [there are] over 400 Gujarati families out of
which 95% are in the hotel business, either work-
ing for a hotel or [owning] a motel.” Table 2 shows
the large and growing Gujarati presence in the
Texas lodging industry. As shown, Gujaratis began
to acquire and found unbranded motels in the late
1970s. They became involved in branded chains as
franchisees only in the 1990s.
Millman (1997) chronicles the rise of the Gujarati-
owned hotels. When India was a British colony,
Gujaratis wound up in England or in African
colonies such as Malawi, Zambia, and Uganda. Many
Gujaratis were expelled from Uganda during the bru-
tal reign of dictator Idi Amin in the 1970s, who also
conﬁscated their businesses. Fleeing with limited sav-
ings, these Indian expatriates searched for suitable
destinations. These Indian expatriates and subsequent
Indian immigrants found nonluxury hotels in the
United States to be an attractive business opportu-
nity for several reasons. First, entry barriers are low.
Table 2 New Foundings and Acquisitions by Date
Unbranded motels Branded chain hotels
Non-Gujarati Gujarati Non-Gujarati Gujarati
Before 1970 51 2 25 0
1970–1974 41 5 22 0
1975–1979 110 61 37 8
1980–1984 166 178 128 6
1985–1989 339 171 390 28
1990–1994 361 298 461 128
1995–1999 207 225 778 351
Notes. This table includes no information about hotels that closed down
before 1990. In the pre-1990 period, only the most recent acquisition date is
known. The same establishment may be counted several times in this table,
once for every ownership transfer. Nonbranded hotels include only those with
the words “motel” or “motor hotel” or “motor inn” in their name.
With an investment of $40,000, the displaced could
secure immigrant status in the United States. With a
$40,000 investment, choice was limited to small estab-
lishments such as diners or roadside motels. Rural
motels were often preferred because they provide
both a business opportunity and a place of residence.
Operating restaurants was not palatable for many
Gujaratis, because as Hindus they were uncomfort-
able handling meat. Contagion further increased the
size of the Gujarati hotel-owner community. Much
like the format adoption of radio stations described in
Greve (1995), the Gujaratis’ likelihood of entering the
lodging industry was much higher than that for other
entrepreneurs, due to contagion. Additional descrip-
tive information about the Gujarati hotel owner phe-
nomenon can be found in Kalnins and Chung (2001).
Gujarati hotel owners are a particularly appropriate
immigrant entrepreneur group with which to test our
hypotheses for two reasons. First, substantial amounts
of social capital appear to be generated within the
Gujarati hotel-owner community. The Gujarati hotel
owners provide each other with solidarity and infor-
mation, considered by Adler and Kwon (2002) to be
two central beneﬁts of social capital. Both of these
beneﬁts reduce costs and should thus increase the
likelihood of establishment survival. We mentioned
earlier a case of a Gujarati branded hotel owner giv-
ing away his used furniture to a Gujarati he had never
met. Other similar anecdotes strengthen this point
(see Greensboro News and Record 1995, p. E1): “Every-
body thinks like a family,” said a Gujarati franchisee
of a Red Carpet Inn in North Carolina. “We try to
help each other   established innkeepers can advise
and support newcomers. When times are tight, they’ll
loan each other money.” Regarding exchange of infor-
mation, he adds, “The Indian immigrants will share
information with each other about which banks offer
the lowest rates on mortgages. They’ll spread among
themselves the names of customers who have stiffed
them on a room bill.” Gujaratis also act collectively,
he notes, stating, “To save money, they’ll join forces to
buy televisions and other hotel equipment in bulk.”
Second, Gujarati hotels largely serve the same pop-
ulation as their indigenously owned counterparts,
allowing us to make performance comparisons and
tease apart the social capital explanation from the
agglomeration explanation for any performance ben-
eﬁts. The native population may also develop social
capital, of course, but time and repeated interactions
are necessary for trust to develop (e.g., Gulati 1995).
The Gujaratis likely enjoy social capital from the
time of their arrival. Immigrant/native comparisons
would be more difﬁcult in cases where immigrant
entrepreneurs mainly serve “enclave economies,”
that is, customers of their own ethnic background
(see, e.g., Aldrich and Waldinger 1990, Bates 1994,
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Uzzi 1996), or when they function as “middlemen
entrepreneurs,” such as the case of Korean-owned
shops in low-income areas (Light and Bonacich 1988).
Relatedly, the fact that Gujaratis are not highly
concentrated in narrow geographical enclaves also
reduces the likelihood that Gujaratis are each other’s
primary competition, which can serve to undermine
the beneﬁts of the group’s social capital (Aldrich and
Waldinger 1990).
3.2. Data
Our data includes all lodging establishments operat-
ing in Texas at any time between 1990–1999 inclusive.
The raw data comes from the Texas State Government
Comptroller’s Ofﬁce, Hotel Tax Permit File. Every
establishment that receives income from room rental
must provide location and ownership data. These
data include a hotel’s name, opening date (and clos-
ing date if applicable), street address, owner name,
owner location, and size in rooms. Owner name con-
sists of a corporation name or the name of a person.
Earlier versions of this data set were used by Kalnins
and Chung (2001) and Chung and Kalnins (2001).
The lodging industry is an ideal setting for this
study because branded chain afﬁliation is an easily
observable indicator that a ﬁrm possesses resources
and has the ability to contribute to social capital.
Chain-afﬁliated hotels will be able to attract more cus-
tomers and charge premium prices because of brand-
ing (Ingram 1996) and thus will accumulate more
resources. Hotels of the branded chains also have
signiﬁcantly higher revenues than unbranded hotels
(Chung and Kalnins 2001).
The most prosperous Gujarati hotel owners have
become franchisees of several large American chains.
In 1999, Gujaratis owned 46 of 138 Best Westerns in
Texas, 69 of 102 Comfort Inns, 78 of 126 Days Inns,
22 of 30 Econolodges, and 55 of 84 Super Eight hotels,
and also have a nontrivial presence among other fran-
chised chains. We note that the Gujaratis dominate
primarily in the lower-tier segment of branded hotels.
In 1999, Gujaratis owned 287 low-tier branded chain
hotels (one- or two-star brands such as Days Inn
and Econolodge), and 143 higher-tier hotels (three-
star brands such as Holiday Inn). For non-Gujaratis,
these numbers are 418 and 683, respectively. Further,
even within each branded chain, the Gujaratis have
lower prices. Based on a 1999 pricing survey of a
cross-section of 797 branded chain hotels, Gujarati
owners charged $3.94 less per room per night, even
after controlling for brand. Implications of these dif-
ferences are discussed in §4.
The lodging industry also contains a clearly iden-
tiﬁable subset of ﬁrms that likely possess the fewest
resources: hotels with the words “motel” or “motor
hotel” or “motor inn” in the business name but
that are not afﬁliated with any franchised chain.
By analyzing only the subset of hotels unafﬁliated
with branded chains with “motel” in their name, we
exclude other unbranded properties such as upscale
bed-and-breakfasts or resort lodges.1 Gujaratis owned
612 of 1,140 unbranded motels in existence in Texas
at the end of 1999. Our interviews conﬁrmed that
the owners of motels unafﬁliated with national chains
possessed few resources. Several told us that they
operated such motels speciﬁcally because they lacked
the funds to buy a larger property of the quality nec-
essary for branded chain afﬁliation. The data pre-
sented in Table 2 conﬁrm the story of evolution of
Gujarati hotel ownership from unbranded motels in
the late 1970s and 1980s when the Gujaratis ﬁrst
arrived in the United States with few resources, to
branded chain hotels via franchising in the 1990s after
many Gujaratis had the opportunity to accumulate
resources.
3.3. Methods
We tested Hypotheses 1 and 2a–2c using event his-
tory analysis. Speciﬁcally, we used parametric hazard
models, which require that a functional form for the
transition rates be speciﬁed. We estimated regressions
using the exponential, Gompertz and Weibull forms,
along with the Cox model that does not require the
speciﬁcation of form. Because our results did not dif-
fer based on the model used, we present results using
the widely-used exponential model. The exponential
form assumes that the instantaneous transition from
origin state (active establishment) to destination state
(establishment-level failure) at time t does not depend
on time t, but depends only on covariates. The gen-
eral form of the model is
rt= exp′X
where r is the instantaneous transition or “hazard”
rate, X is a vector of covariates, and  is the vector of
coefﬁcients. Because the values of all our covariates
of theoretical interest change over time, we split the
life histories of all establishments into yearly spells,
and for each spell set all covariates to their values
at the beginning of that year (see, e.g., Ingram and
1 We analyzed only the survival of unbranded motels, but not of
branded chain hotels, due to insufﬁcient failure. Only 15 failures
among the Gujarati-owned chain hotels took place in the 1990s. We
did analyze “survival as a branded hotel” for all branded hotels,
where an ex-branded hotel that continues to operate as unbranded
is treated as a failure. Using this deﬁnition, 109 of 837 branded
hotels rated two stars by the American Automobile Association
(AAA) did not survive. We found that a Marshallian agglomeration
beneﬁt appeared to exist for two-star hotels in the vicinity of any
three-star hotels, roughly of equal size for both Gujarati and non-
Gujarati two-star hotels. There was no indication of a social capital
effect.
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Baum 1997). The parameters were then estimated by
the method of maximum likelihood.
As mentioned earlier, many of the motels were in
business before 1990, meaning that part of the sam-
ple is left-truncated—establishments that entered and
exited before 1990 are not in the sample. Including
establishments founded before 1990 but exiting after
1990 in the analysis does not cause left-censoring
problems because the Texas data set contains informa-
tion about the founding dates, even if those are before
1990. For example, the event history model will only
analyze a motel founded in 1985 with others that have
survived until the ﬁfth year. It will never be directly
compared to motels in the ﬁrst four years after found-
ing. Thus, the problems of left-censoring are avoided.
See Guo (1993) and Stata Corp. (2001, pp. 441–446) for
extensive discussions.
The dependent variable for the event history analy-
sis is motel survival. Motels are considered survivors
as long as they remain open for business. They are
“at risk of failure” until they have permanently closed
down. We do not consider motels to have failed in any
way merely due to changes of ownership or “doing
business as” name.
Hypotheses 3a–3c, the determinants of location
choice, are tested using the conditional logit model for
discrete choice—when an actor chooses from among
a set of options. The conditional logit is commonly
used in studies of location choice in the ﬁelds of
strategy and organization theory (e.g., Greve 2000,
Powell et al. 2004, Shaver and Flyer 2000). An exten-
sive general description can be found in Greene (1998,
pp. 520–537). In our setting, a new hotel owner
chooses from among geographic locations based upon
attributes of the locations.
The conditional logit model is speciﬁed as follows.
The alternatives j include the 578 zip codes in Texas
with at least one hotel present. Each observation,
therefore, has 578 rows of data. The observed depen-
dent variable Yij = 1 if zip code j is chosen, and Yij = 0
for the 577 zip codes not chosen. Assuming a linear
relationship with the latent variable, we can write
Vij = b′Xij + eij 
where X is a vector of independent variables of theo-
retical interest and control variables that are discussed
in the next section. Positive values for the coefﬁ-
cients b imply that zip codes possessing high values of
the associated variables have a higher probability of
being assigned the mandate. Negative coefﬁcients can
be interpreted as lower probabilities of being chosen.
We note that, of course, each entrepreneur wishing
to open a new hotel is not actively considering all 578
zip codes as location choices. The entrepreneur may
only be actively considering ﬁve or six sites, but the
area may be much broader. One Gujarati hotel owner
that we spoke to in our interviews told us that he
searched within a 60-mile radius of a major urban
center, implying that many zip codes were at least
summarily considered. Importantly, the results of the
conditional logit model are not biased if additional
alternatives are included that are not actively con-
sidered by some. Parsons and Hauber (1998) con-
ducted a systematic study of the effects of choice set
size on conditional logit coefﬁcients, and concluded
that adding many alternatives with low likelihoods of
being chosen had almost no effect.
3.4. Description of Independent Variables
Our independent variables of theoretical interest con-
sist of a dummy variable for Gujarati hotel ownership
and measures of Gujarati and non-Gujarati owner-
ship in the vicinity of a hotel under observation. We
use the owner surname to determine membership in
the community of Gujarati immigrant entrepreneurs.
Upon being shown a list of all surnames of hotel
owners, two Gujaratis designated for us the following
surnames to be Gujarati: Patel, Bhakta, Desai, Amin,
Gandhi, Mistry, Thakor, Jallab, Shah, Govind, Zaveri,
Rama, Rana, Mehta, Nathu, and Dalwad. Over 90%
of Gujarati hotels are owned by those with the sur-
names Patel and Bhakta. In our data, hotel owners
are often listed as corporations. To identify Gujarati
corporations, we used the Texas Incorporation data
ﬁle compiled by the Secretary of State and compared
the list of all corporations owned by Gujaratis (based
on the same surnames as above) with the corpora-
tions that owned hotels. We consider any hotel that
is incorporated and has a partner with a Gujarati sur-
name to be a Gujarati-owned hotel. Finally, we note
that due to ownership changes, the same hotel may be
considered Gujarati-owned in some periods but not
in others.
To operationalize the idea of ﬁrms with resources
in the vicinity of each hotel under observation, we
observe the ownership of the 10 closest hotels from
the latitude and longitude coordinates of the hotel’s
actual location for the survival analysis. For the con-
ditional logit analysis, we observe the ownership
of the 10 closest hotels from each zip code’s cen-
troid, because the actual hotel had not yet been built.
Among the 10 closest hotels, we include as separate
variables the counts of branded-chain hotels (those
likely to possess resources) and unbranded motels
(those likely to possess few resources). These counts
are further separated into hotels owned by Gujaratis
and those owned by others. Importantly, these counts
do not include other hotels belonging to the same
owner as the hotel under observation. These counts
capture the presence of Gujaratis with resources in the
vicinity of the hotel under observation. The counts
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Figure 1 The 10 Closest Hotels to the Gujarati-Owned Pinn Road Motel
(San Antonio, Texas)
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Notes. Proximate branded hotels owned by Gujaratis: Best Western +
Holiday Inn + Rodeway = 3. Proximate branded hotels owned by non-
Gujaratis: La Quinta+ Red Roof+ Econolodge = 3. Proximate nonbranded
hotels owned by Gujaratis: Best Inn Motel+El Camino Motel= 2. Proximate
nonbranded hotels owned by non-Gujaratis: Dunes Motel= 1. Economy Inn
is not counted because the word “motel” (or “motor hotel,” “motor inn,” or
“motor lodge”) does not appear in its name.
are then interacted with the Gujarati owner binary
variable to assess whether only Gujaratis beneﬁt from
the proximate presence of other Gujaratis. Figure 1
illustrates how the count variables are calculated. In
the ﬁgure, the Dunes Motel is the 10th closest hotel
to the Pinn Road Motel, the hotel under observation.
We draw a circle around the Pinn Road Motel with
a radius equal to the distance to the Dunes Motel
(0.7 miles). All hotels within this radius are included
in one of the counts as long as they are either branded
or have the word “motel” or “motor hotel” or “motor
inn” in their name. The values for the count variables
Table 3 How Many Branded Chain Hotels Are Proximate (Within 10 Closest Hotels) to Unbranded Motels?
Number of Gujarati branded Number of non-Gujarati branded chain
chain hotels within 10 closest hotels hotels within 10 closest hotels
0 1 2 3 4 5–10 0 1 2 3 4 5–10
449 unbranded Gujarati 375 66 8 96 196 98 67 48 34
motels in 1990
794 unbranded non-Gujarati 663 111 18 2 148 230 188 82 75 71
motels in 1990
612 unbranded Gujarati 207 196 99 72 30 8 137 135 136 97 35 70
motels in 1999
505 unbranded non-Gujarati 205 156 75 44 24 1 92 129 121 67 28 68
motels in 1999
for the Pinn Road Motel are calculated at the bottom
of Figure 1.
Table 3 shows us the distribution of Gujarati and
non-Gujarati branded hotels in the proximity of
(within the 10 closest hotels) Gujarati and non-Gujarati
unbranded motels. For example, among the 612
unbranded Gujarati motels in existence in 1999, there
were 196 with one Gujarati-owned branded hotel in
their vicinity, and 209 99+72+30+8with more than
one. So, 65% of all unbranded Gujarati motels in 1991
were able to enjoy some social capital from their more
prosperous fellow group members.
We use the 10 closest hotels rather than a ﬁxed
distance limit because the ordinal distance to a
high-resource immigrant entrepreneur group mem-
ber is likely more important than the actual phys-
ical distance. If a low-resource member establish-
ment is physically close to a high-resource member,
but if other needy members are even closer to that
resource-rich establishment, then the given establish-
ment is less likely to receive beneﬁt from the group’s
social capital. Completely exogenous administrative
areas such as counties and metropolitan statistical
areas vary too much in size to capture the opportu-
nity set within which immigrant entrepreneurs can
contribute to the social capital of the group. For
example, Harris County (home of Houston) had 54
unbranded Gujarati-owned hotels and 53 unbranded
non-Gujarati motels in 1999, while Deaf Smith County
only had four unbranded motels, all owned by
Gujaratis. To ensure our results were not sensitive
to the “10th closest hotel” deﬁnition, we estimated
regressions with other counts as well as zip codes.
Results using alternative deﬁnitions are similar and
are discussed in the robustness tests section.
Beyond these focal variables we control for the
characteristics of each hotel and its owner. We include
the logged distance from the hotel to its owner’s
headquarters to control for absentee owner effects. We
also include the room count of each hotel because
larger properties have been consistently shown to be
more likely to survive (e.g., Ingram and Baum 1997).
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We also include the count of other proximate hotels
of the same owner (if any) and the owner’s proximate
experience (calculated as in Ingram and Baum 1997,
using a square root discount factor) at the time of the
founding or acquisition of the establishment under
observation (congenital experience) and a dummy
variable for left truncation (whether the hotel was
opened before 1990). These variables are included for
the survival analysis, but not for the conditional logit.
In the latter case, these variables cannot be included
because they are invariant across choice locations.
To control for demographics of each hotel’s vicin-
ity, we include the mileage distance to the 10th closest
hotel (that serves as the radius for our hotel counts).
Rural areas are likely to have larger distances to the
10th closest hotel. We include zip code residential
population and per capita income (both from the 1990
census) to capture levels of potential demand. We
also include the net addition of retail establishments
in the two years previous to each spell to control
for economic growth. In addition, we included the
count of unbranded motel rooms in the zip code (but
owned by others), as a measure of how much com-
petition each unbranded motel faced. These variables
are included for both the exponential hazard regres-
sions and the conditional logit regressions. Descrip-
tive statistics and correlations for all independent
variables are included in Table 4 for the exponential
hazard data set (the descriptive statistics for the con-
ditional logit data set were so similar that they are not
included separately).
4. Results
4.1. Results of the Exponential Hazard
Model—An Analysis of Failure Rates
The results for the exponential hazard analysis of
failure rates are shown in Table 5. There are four
columns. The ﬁrst column contains control vari-
ables only. The second column adds the “Gujarati-
Owned Motel” variable to test Hypothesis 1. The
third column includes four counts of proximate
hotels: Gujarati and non-Gujarati branded hotels, and
Gujarati and non-Gujarati unbranded motels. The
last column adds interaction terms with the Gujarati
owner binary variable to test Hypotheses 2a–2c.
The results in the 2nd through 4th columns sup-
port Hypothesis 1—membership in an immigrant
entrepreneur group helps low-resource establish-
ments. Unbranded Gujarati motels survive substan-
tially longer than unbranded non-Gujarati motels,
based on the signiﬁcance of the very ﬁrst coefﬁcient of
each column. Hypothesis 2a—the social capital of the
immigrant entrepreneur groups helps low-resource
group members more than it helps low-resource
nonmembers—is supported because the coefﬁcient
of the interaction term “Gujarati owner× proximate
Gujarati hotels” is negative and statistically signiﬁ-
cant in the 4th column. Unbranded motels owned by
Gujaratis have a lower probability of failure, relative
to unbranded non-Gujarati motels, when proximate
branded Gujarati-owned hotels are present. The fail-
ure rate comparison between the unbranded Gujarati
motels and unbranded non-Gujarati motels is valu-
able because it demonstrates that the resources of
branded Gujarati hotels only beneﬁt those hotels lack-
ing resources that are also Gujarati. This is not a
spillover effect that applies to all proximate hotels,
but a selective beneﬁt from high-resource immigrant
entrepreneur group members to less prosperous coun-
trymen. Hotels owned by the same owner as that
of the hotel under observation are not included in
the proximate hotel counts, so our result here is not
merely a multiunit ownership effect.
Note that the primary variable “Proximate hotels
owned by Gujaratis” increases the likelihood of
unbranded motel failure. The coefﬁcient of the
Gujarati interaction term is larger than that of the pri-
mary term, indicating that the net effect for Gujarati
unbranded motels is survival enhancing. While the
social capital theory discussed above does not predict
a harmful effect for nongroup members, two possi-
ble mechanisms could be generating the higher failure
rates for non-Gujarati unbranded motels in the vicin-
ity of Gujarati branded hotels. First, the “Red Queen
effect” has been shown to operate at the level of
groups of organizations (Ingram and Simons 2002). In
other words, the cooperation between group member
organizations indirectly hurts nonmember organiza-
tions because the latter become relatively less com-
petitive. Second, as discussed earlier, Gujarati chain
hotels are more likely to belong to low-tier chains,
and have the lowest prices, even within those chains.
These ﬁndings suggest that the quality of unbranded
motels in the vicinity of Gujarati chain hotels may be
low, and that such hotels might be the most prone to
failure. The social capital of the Gujarati group can
help those unbranded establishments overcome the
higher likelihood of failure faced by other unbranded
motels.
Hypotheses 2b and 2c—that low-resource group
members beneﬁt more from high-resource group
members than from high-resource nonmembers or
from low-resource nonmembers—require compar-
isons between the interaction effect of “Gujarati
owner× proximate Gujarati hotels” versus “Gujarati
owner × proximate non-Gujarati hotels” and ver-
sus “Gujarati owner×proximate unbranded Gujarati
hotels.” Table 6 displays the chi-square tests of size
differences of these coefﬁcients from Table 5.
Hypothesis 2b is supported, as demonstrated by
the statistical signiﬁcance of the ﬁrst chi-square test
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Table 5 Exponential Hazard Models Predicting 298 Failures Among
1,457 Unbranded Motels
(1) Gujarati-owned unbranded motels −0809∗∗ −0900∗∗ −1110
0138 0142 0696
(2) Proximate branded hotels 0174∗ 0265∗∗
owned by Gujaratis 0069 0076
(3) Gujarati owner× proximate −0367∗
Gujarati hotels (Hypothesis 2a) 0176
(4) Proximate branded hotels −0057 −0059
owned by non-Gujaratis 0047 0053
(5) Gujarati owner× proximate 0019
non-Gujarati hotels (Comparison 0113
for Hypothesis 2b)
(6) Proximate unbranded motels −0019 −0044
owned by Gujaratis 0042 0050
(7) Gujarati owner× proximate 0066
unbranded Gujarati motels 0097
(Comparison for Hypothesis 2c)
(8) Proximate unbranded motels −0115∗ −0134∗∗
owned by non-Gujaratis 0047 0052
(9) Gujarati owner× proximate 0103
unbranded non-Gujarati motels 0112
(10) Log distance to owner’s 0155∗∗ 0148∗∗ 0155∗∗ 0154∗∗
headquarters 0027 0027 0027 0027
(11) Number of rooms −0009∗∗ −0011∗∗ −0012∗∗ −0012∗∗
0003 0003 0003 0003
(12) Same owner’s proximate hotels 0072 0022 −0036 −0047
0213 0210 0212 0212
(13) Same owner’s proximate −0016 0005 0009 0012
experience 0063 0061 0061 0063
(14) Left truncated observation 0031 0084 0204 0220
0201 0201 0203 0204
(15) Log distance to 10th closest 0000 0000 0000 0000
(i.e., proximate) hotel 0000 0000 0000 0000
(16) Population of zip 0004 0006 0005 0005
0005 0005 0005 0005
(17) Per capita income of zip −0015 −0015 −0021∗ −0022∗
0010 0009 0010 0010
(18) Retail outlet growth in zip −0024∗∗ −0026∗∗ −0023∗∗ −0023∗∗
0003 0003 0003 0003
(19) Unbranded motel rooms in zip 0001 0000 0001 0001
0001 0001 0001 0001
(20) Age 1–2 years 0416 0409 0497+ 0470+
0284 0284 0284 0285
(21) Age 3–5 years 0586∗∗ 0586∗∗ 0635∗∗ 0619∗∗
0174 0173 0175 0175
(22) Age 6–10 years 0139 0234+ 0252+ 0216
0139 0140 0141 0141
Chi squared 121.4 159.6 178.7 188.8
Notes. Positive coefﬁcients indicate greater likelihood of failure.
Two-tailed tests: +p < 010; ∗p < 005; ∗∗p < 001.
in Table 6. The coefﬁcient of the “Gujarati owner ×
proximate Gujarati hotels” interaction term variable
in Table 5 is signiﬁcantly larger than that of the
“Gujarati owner × proximate non-Gujarati hotels”
interaction term. This statistically signiﬁcant greater
effect demonstrates that the reduction in failure rates
to unbranded Gujarati motels, relative to unbranded
non-Gujarati motels, is not caused by the presence
of just any branded chain hotel. The branded hotels
must be owned by Gujaratis.
Hypothesis 2c is also supported. The coefﬁcient
of the “Gujarati owner × proximate Gujarati hotels”
interaction term variable is signiﬁcantly larger than
that of the “Gujarati owner × proximate unbranded
Gujarati motels” interaction term, as demonstrated
Table 6 Differences Between Coefﬁcients from Column 4 of Table 5
Coefﬁcient Chi-square (1)
Gujarati owner× proximate −0367
Gujarati hotels
Gujarati owner× proximate 0019
non-Gujarati hotels
Hypothesis 2b: coeff 3 > coeff (5) 452∗
Gujarati owner× proximate 0066
unbranded Gujarati motels
Hypothesis 2c: coeff 3 > coeff (7) 676∗∗
Note. Chi-square test: ∗p < 005; ∗∗p < 001.
by the signiﬁcance of the second chi-squared test in
Table 6. The proximate presence of branded Gujarati
hotels is far more beneﬁcial to the unbranded Gujarati
motel owner than is the presence of other unbranded
Gujarati motels in his or her vicinity. This ﬁnd-
ing supports the idea that resources are required
for an immigrant entrepreneur to have the ability
to contribute to the group’s social capital and to
help other group members. The proximate presence
of unbranded Gujarati motels does not signiﬁcantly
increase or decrease the likelihood of failure of other
unbranded Gujarati motels, relative to their effect on
unbranded non-Gujarati motels.
Among the control variables, larger hotels are more
likely to survive longer, as are hotels whose head-
quarters are more proximate. This interesting result
indicates a cost to absentee ownership. Hotels will
also survive longer in areas with high levels of retail
growth.
To summarize, the combination of support for
Hypotheses 2a–2c strongly suggests that immigrant
entrepreneur group members without resources only
beneﬁt from the presence of group members with
resources. By separating group members from prox-
imate nongroup members, we isolated empirically
a social-capital-based group effect from any general
agglomeration or spillover effect that would arise
from the presence of branded chain hotels owned by
anyone, or simply in more proﬁtable or high-growth
areas.
4.2. Results of the Conditional Logit Model—
An Analysis of Location Choice
Hypotheses 3a–3c, which predicted that low-resource
member establishments will locate close to high-
resource member establishments but not to high-
resource nonmembers or low-resource members, are
tested in Table 7 using a conditional logit model
of location choice. While the hypotheses are not
supported, interesting results emerge. In particular,
the coefﬁcient of the “Gujarati owner × proximate
unbranded Gujarati motels” is positive and signiﬁ-
cant, which suggests that the presence of unbranded
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Table 7 Conditional Logit Model (Location Choices of New Unbranded
Motels)
(2) Proximate branded hotels −0067 −0122
owned by Gujaratis 0124 0166
(3) Gujarati owner× proximate 0139
Gujarati hotels (Hypothesis 3a) 0241
(4) Proximate branded hotels −0092 −0091
owned by non-Gujaratis 0060 0075
(5) Gujarati owner× proximate 0001
non-Gujarati hotels (Comparison 0118
for Hypothesis 3b)
(6) Proximate unbranded motels 0011 −0136
owned by Gujaratis 0062 0086
(7) Gujarati owner× proximate 0287∗
unbranded Gujarati motels 0116
(Comparison for Hypothesis 3c)
(8) Proximate unbranded motels 0006 0070
owned by non-Gujaratis 0066 0076
(9) Gujarati owner× proximate −0197+
unbranded non-Gujarati motels 0116
(12) Same owner’s proximate hotels 2420∗∗ 2489∗∗ 2496∗∗
0540 0533 0524
(13) Same owner’s proximate 0046 0035 0029
experience 0064 0063 0062
(15) Log distance to 10th closest 0270∗∗ 0238∗∗ 0247∗∗
(i.e., proximate) hotel 0075 0085 0085
(16) Population of zip 0012 0013+ 0013+
0007 0007 0007
(17) Per capita income of zip −0060∗∗ −0052∗∗ −0051∗∗
0012 0013 0013
(18) Retail outlet growth in zip −0007∗ −0007+ −0007+
0004 0004 0004
(19) Unbranded motel rooms in zip 0009∗ 0006 0007
0004 0005 0005
Chi squared 159.6 163.6 182.4
Notes. N = 178 hotels (67 Gujarati) choosing among 578 zip codes. Vari-
ables 1, 11, and 14 could not be included because they do not differ within
the set of alternatives for each owner. Variable 10 is not included because it
is often endogenous to the choice of location.
Two-tailed tests: +p < 010; ∗p < 005; ∗∗p < 001.
Gujarati motels increases a location’s attractiveness to
Gujarati entrepreneurs. Given the strong support for
Hypotheses 2a–2c, which predicted that low-resource
member ﬁrms beneﬁt more from the presence of
high-resource members than from other establishment
types, this opposite result to Hypothesis 3c’s expecta-
tion is intriguing. We discuss the implications below.
Among the control variables in the conditional logit
regressions, we ﬁnd that owners locate in the vicinity
of their existing hotels (if they have any). More inter-
esting is the fact that they are more likely to locate
in low-income areas and areas where the logged dis-
tance to the 10th closest hotel is greater, which is the
case in more rural areas. These ﬁndings suggest that
the unbranded motel retains a niche in these markets
typically overlooked by the large branded chains.
4.3. Robustness Tests
Before settling on our main results, we conducted
several alternate tests. While presenting results using
the closest 10 hotels as the relevant vicinity for the
hotel under observation, we also varied the count
downwards to the closest 5 hotels and upwards to
the closest 15, 20, 30, and 40 hotels, and also used
the counts in each hotel’s zip code. The survival
results (Hypotheses 1 and 2a–2c) presented hold for
the range between 5 and 15 hotels, and marginal sig-
niﬁcance remained when using the zip code. The sta-
bility of results in the 5 to 15 range suggests that the
closest 20, 30, or 40 hotels is too broad a range. While
the distance to the 30th closest hotel may not be too
far for high-resource owners to have the opportunity
to understand the needs of other owners within their
ethnic community, there are likely to be other needy
establishments closer to the high-resource owner that
will receive the beneﬁts. The conditional logit results
that Gujaratis are attracted to locations with other
unbranded Gujarati motels are also robust between
the range of 5 and 20 hotels, as well as to the case of
zip codes.
In addition, we split the Texan hotel population
into metro and rural subsamples (we deﬁned metro
areas as Texas’ 10 most populous counties, which con-
tain the state’s major cities). We found that Hypothe-
ses 1 and 2a–2c hold for the metro subsample, and
that Hypotheses 1, 2a, and 2b hold for the rural sub-
sample. Hypothesis 2c is very close to signiﬁcant
for the latter subsample p < 0113. We ﬁnd par-
ticularly interesting the fact that the social capital
of the immigrant group remains important in metro
areas where the individual entrepreneurs should have
more opportunity to obtain resources from the native
population.
5. Discussion
5.1. Contribution to the Literature
Our study provides interesting ﬁndings regarding
heterogeneity of contribution and beneﬁts within
groups of immigrant entrepreneurs. Both opportunity
and ability enhance a group member’s contributions
to and beneﬁts from the group’s social capital. Mem-
bers of the group that possess more resources are less
likely to be helped by others in the group, because the
others are unlikely to possess resources that the high-
resource group members would ﬁnd valuable. In this
sense, our ﬁndings are very consistent with those of
other research streams on other types of interaction
between ﬁrms where resource heterogeneity has been
explicitly considered. Ahuja (2000) and Shaver and
Flyer (2000), for example, ﬁnd that ﬁrms with their
own resources are less likely to seek alliances and
agglomeration opportunities, respectively. In those
cases, similar to ours, ﬁrms with few resources ben-
eﬁt most from cooperation while those with abun-
dant resources contribute the most. The result also
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complements sociological work on entrepreneurship
that has found performance beneﬁts for entrepreneurs
able to afﬁliate with high-status venture capitalists
(Stuart et al. 1999). Yet, unlike those instances, the
immigrant entrepreneurs are well aware of their con-
tributions to others in their group, and do not appear
to try to avoid such contributions (as do the ﬁrms in
Ahuja 2000 and Shaver and Flyer 2000), nor do they
charge a premium as do the high-status venture cap-
italists (Hsu 2004). In fact, based on our interviews,
established high-resource Gujarati hotel owners were
proud of being able to contribute without any com-
pensation, consistent with the ideas of shared values
and shared destiny.
Our results presented here for one large group of
immigrant entrepreneurs complements work about
performance heterogeneity within the large indus-
trial business groups such as chaebols and keiretsus
(e.g., Guillen 2000, Khanna and Rivkin 2001, Lincoln
et al. 1996) as well as Israeli kibbutzim (Ingram and
Simons 2002). Indeed, the results here broaden the
scope of applicability for that literature. Like our
group of immigrant entrepreneurs, industrial busi-
ness groups often revolve around family and ethnic
ties (Granovetter 1994). Unlike the small-enterprise
level of the Gujaratis, large industrial business groups
include the cross-holding of equity and substantial
employment of workers from outside the group. Yet,
the basic principle underlying our hypotheses—that
ability and opportunity matter for contributions to
and beneﬁts from social capital—should hold for any
group bound by norms other than an incentive to
maximize individual proﬁts.
Given the beneﬁts for a Gujarati unbranded motel
to be in the vicinity of a branded Gujarati hotel, the
result that Gujarati entrepreneurs are likely to locate
their unbranded motels primarily in the vicinity of
other unbranded Gujarati motels is surprising. This
result suggests that the location is not chosen to
increase potential personal beneﬁts via proximate
high-resource group members. It also suggests that
the location choice is not made merely to enjoy the
social beneﬁts of many proximate group members
because these beneﬁts should arise from locating
proximately to any type of Gujarati establishment,
high or low resource. Finally, the result reduces the
possibility that these foundings are spin-offs from
existing ﬁrms (e.g., Klepper and Sleeper 2002) that
locate proximately to the entrepreneur’s previous
employer (Sorenson and Audia 2000). While some
Gujaratis do “spin-off” by ﬁrst working for the hotel
of another Gujarati, the employing hotel is typically
a branded property that requires additional staff. The
unbranded motels are often literal “mom and pop”
operations that only require one or two additional
part-time staff (Kalnins and Chung 2001, p. 34). Of
the 16 Gujarati hotel owners that we interviewed,
only three had previously worked for branded chain
hotels.
Why then should Gujaratis locate their unbranded
motels proximate to other unbranded Gujarati
motels? Baum et al. (2000) found that ﬁrms were
more likely to imitate similar others than large, visible
ﬁrms in spatial location decisions. Our ﬁndings sug-
gest that the Gujarati entrepreneurs, too, are locating
mimetically in the vicinity of the most socially sim-
ilar others—other unbranded Gujarati motels. Alter-
natively, the cost of locating in an area with branded
properties may be prohibitive for entrepreneurs seek-
ing to found an unbranded motel. We note that our
split of Gujarati hotels into high- and low-resource
subgroups clariﬁes some insigniﬁcant results pre-
sented by Kalnins and Chung (2001). In that study,
the Gujaratis were not split into the two groups and
no localized clustering was found to occur.
Our results regarding the importance of group
membership and geographical proximity complement
the large and growing literature of social networks
(see, e.g., Burt 2000 for an extensive review). For
example, Bruderl and Preisendorfer (1998) highlight
the beneﬁts of family members to entrepreneurs,
while Ingram and Roberts (2000) demonstrate the
importance of friendship ties for hotel manage-
ment. Similarly, Starr and MacMillan (1990) stress
the importance of ties for procuring resources. The
geography-based arguments presented here are simi-
lar to the network literature’s arguments that individ-
uals within a network beneﬁt heterogeneously based
on their network position. Much like geographical
proximity, a network tie provides an opportunity to
help fellow group members. We believe that immi-
grant entrepreneur groups would be an interesting
setting for a thorough study of friendship and net-
work ties both within and outside the group. Based
on our interviews, groups such as the Gujaratis clearly
have networks of family and friends within the indus-
try that can contribute to social capital above and
beyond simple group membership, and even when
outside their geographical vicinity.
5.2. Caveats
Before concluding, we note two caveats. First, while
our results are consistent with Hypothesis 1, the busi-
ness establishments of immigrant entrepreneur group
members may survive longer than their indigenously
owned counterparts for reasons not directly result-
ing from membership in the immigrant group. Immi-
grant group members often possess higher levels of
human capital (such as education) than their com-
petition because they may not have the wide range
of opportunities that educated locals possess (Light
and Bonacich 1988, Sanders and Nee 1996). We do
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not discount this explanation. In fact, we believe that
it complements our explanations of success based on
social capital. We do note, however, that human cap-
ital explanations do not exist for Hypotheses 2a–2c:
enhanced survival in the vicinity of other group
members cannot be explained without explicit group
effects.
Second, while the results presented in this paper
provide systematic statistical evidence regarding the
economic importance of social capital within groups
of immigrant entrepreneurs, the results here are lim-
ited to one U.S. state, one ethnic group, and one
industry. Nevertheless, Texas is a large state with
a wide variety of location types (e.g., urban, rural,
major highways, and coastal resorts) that appear rep-
resentative of those existing throughout the United
States. Further, our interviews with Gujaratis indi-
cated that their behavior conforms to that expected by
social capital theory, also suggesting generalizability.
While the hotel industry has some idiosyncrasies (low
entry costs and the ability to operate independently
or as a part of a franchised branded chain), it is likely
that these structural features have allowed a group of
immigrant entrepreneurs to ﬂourish and even domi-
nate the industry. As the Gujaratis have accumulated
resources they have remained in the industry, but
from the more proﬁtable and powerful vantage of the
franchised branded chains.
6. Conclusion
Groups within a capitalist economy that can develop
and maintain local social capital have been sug-
gested as a vital source of entrepreneurial talent,
even in developed nations (Putnam 1995, 2000). We
assessed the importance of a group of immigrant
entrepreneurs within the lodging industry, arguing
that group membership provides critical resources for
struggling members, thereby improving likelihood of
establishment survival, relative to that enjoyed by
nonmembers. While controlling for agglomeration-
based beneﬁts that do not require group membership
to accrue, we developed and tested hypotheses that
survival beneﬁts enjoyed by group members are the
result of social capital. Some ﬁrms may contribute
to and beneﬁt from the group’s social capital differ-
ently due to differences in their ability and opportu-
nity. Greater stocks of social capital enable ﬁrms to
initiate social exchange. Firms with few resources are
unlikely to be able to help their fellow group mem-
bers even if they had the motivation and opportu-
nity. Also, geographical proximity is important for
the opportunity to conduct social exchanges. Consis-
tent with these arguments, we found that proximate
group member ﬁrms with resources increased the
likelihood of survival of other group member ﬁrms
in their vicinity signiﬁcantly more than the proxi-
mate presence of high-resource nongroup members.
These results reinforce the importance of social capital
not only for immigrant entrepreneurs but also more
generally for any entrepreneurs that have the ability
of participating in ethnic, professional, religious, or
social groups.
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